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In a two-period model, firms specialized in two different sectors lobby to induce the 
government to subsidize the type of education complementary to their production. Lobbying 
is endogenous. We show that, if lobbying is not costly, both sectors will lobby in equilibrium 
and education policy will induce the same skill composition that would be chosen by the 
social planner. However, if lobbying is costly, only one sector finds it profitable to offer 
monetary contribution and direct resources towards the type of education required by its 
production. Which sector will engage in lobbying depends on relative size, productivity and 
price in the two sectors. 






Debora Di Gioacchino 
Sapienza University of Rome 
















We thank Maurizio Franzini, Vincenzo Galasso, Francesco Vona and Brunero Liseo for 
useful comments. We thank Elena Pisano for excellent research assistance. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Modern economies devote a relevant share of their resources to education. However, even
OECD countries diﬀer not only in the share of GDP devoted to education, but also in the
composition of education expenditures, in the graduation rate and in the distribution of
graduates by level of education (primary/secondary vs tertiary), by program orientation
(vocational vs general) and by ﬁeld of education (cfr. tables 1 and 2). In countries such as
the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, the education system is mainly oriented
towards general rather than vocational programmes. Diﬀerently, Germany, Finland, Italy,
and many others, have a relevant share of students enrolled in vocational programmes.
As for the share of graduates by ﬁeld of education, countries such as Korea, Finland and
Sweden have a high share of graduates in engineering, while the United States, Luxemburg,
Australia and New Zealand have a high share of students graduating in business.1
In this paper, we argue that diﬀerences in the composition of human capital are related
to the production structure of the economy and we emphasize the potential key role of
ﬁrms’ political pressure activity. Skills are required by ﬁrms according to their needs and
are acquired through the education system, whose outcome is a composition of human
capital by level, ﬁeld and program orientation. In a rapidly changing economy there is
high demand for workers equipped with general skills, which are more mobile and can
easily be adapted in new sectors. Analogously, the distribution by ﬁeld of education
should reﬂect the sectoral composition of the economy. Economies endowed with a higher
share of human resources in science and technology are in a better position to innovate
and expand production in high-tech sectors. On the other hand, if a relevant share of ﬁrms
is specialized in high-tech production, demand for graduates in science and engineering
1Notice also that in Sweden 17% of students in 2008 graduated in engineering, manufacturing and
construction; among them, 78% graduated in engineering. Analogously, in the United States, 40% of
students graduated in social science, business and law; of them, 54% graduated in business. Even more
striking are the diﬀerences among the shares of graduates by ﬁeld of education relative to total population.
In the United States, of the relatively low number of graduates for 1000 inhabitants (7.7) 3 graduated in
social science business and law (SSBL) and 0.5 in engineering, manufacturing and construction (EMC). In
Korea instead, of the 8.2 graduates for 1000 inhabitants, 1.9 graduated in SSBL and 1.9 in EMC.
3is correspondingly high. Thus, the direction of causality is diﬃcult to identify and the
relationship is probably not one-way.
Table 3 reports, for the year 2006, the sectoral composition of production for 30 OECD
countries. Countries such as Korea, Finland and to a certain extent also Ireland and Japan,
have a high share of production in manufacturing, focused on high and medium-high tech,
and a relatively lower share of value added in services. On the other hand, United States,
United Kingdom and France have high share of production in services, mainly in ﬁnance
insurance and business services.
As shown in ﬁgures 1 and 2, there appears to be a positive correlation between countries
productive specialization and the composition of graduates by ﬁeld of study. Figure 1 plots
the shares of graduates in science and engineering in association with the share of value
added in high-tech sectors. Figure 2 plots the share of graduates in social science, business
and law in 2008 in association with the share of value added in ﬁnance, insurance and
business services. However, the two diagrams, and the value of R-squared, also indicate
that a relevant fraction of the variance remains unexplained. This suggests that something
else, beside an economy’s sectoral composition, is needed to account for diﬀerences in the
composition of human capital.
In this paper, we ask whether the missing ingredient may be related to politics and
to political economy aspects. We start from the observation that lobbying activity may
be very intensive in some country. In the US for instance (but similarly in Canada),
universities, companies, labor unions, and other organizations spend billions of dollars
each year to lobby Congress and federal agencies. In 2010 total lobbying spending was
$2.61 billion with a total number of 12488 lobbyists (Open Secrets, 2010). Among the
top spenders we ﬁnd several companies. We also know that many lobbying groups have
focused on the improvement of education (which is among the top ten issues with more
than one thousand clients per year) and degrees awarded by students in speciﬁc ﬁelds
(Carlson, 2005). As reported by the Center for Responsive Politics (Open Secrets, 2010)
in the US, which, as we already noticed, have a high share of students graduating in
business and a high share of production in ﬁnance insurance and business services, in
2010 insurance industries have spent $120,627,007 and business associations have spent
4$105,003,616 in lobbying activities.2 The amount spent in lobbying activities by these two
sectors ranks ﬁrst among the industry sectors.3 If companies in insurance and business
lobby for more spending in education for business, lobbying activity may play a role in
shaping the relation between the type of education and the structure of production.
We analyze the political economy of education in a setting in which ﬁrms specialized in
(two) diﬀerent sectors try to induce the government to ﬁnance the type of education which
is complementary to their production. In our two-period model, there is a continuum of
ﬁrms specialized in one of the two sectors and a continuum of workers who live for two
periods. In each sector, ﬁrms use as production-input labour of a given skill-type. In the
ﬁrst period, individuals choose which type of education to acquire; this determines the
skill composition of workers in the second period. Education is subsidized by the govern-
ment. Firms may lobby the government to inﬂuence its education policy so as to obtain a
favorable skill composition of the labour force. Following Bernheim and Winston’s (1986)
common agency approach, ﬁrstly applied in economics by Grossman and Helpman (1994),
we assume that ﬁrms can oﬀer monetary contributions to the policy-maker conditional on
the structure of education subsidies chosen. Moreover, following a more recent strand of
the literature (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007), we allow for endogenous lobbying. We
are able to show that, if there are no costs of lobbying, then both sectors will lobby in equi-
librium. In this political equilibrium the policy-maker chooses the same skill composition
that would be chosen by the social planner. However, if lobbying is costly, as it is more
realistic to assume, it may be that only one sector will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to oﬀer monetary
contributions. This is the sector with a higher relative weight, measured by relative size,
productivity and price. Thus, the lobbying activity may contribute to explain diﬀerences
in educational systems across economies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: next section reviews the related literature;
section 3 presents the model and section 4 derives the political equilibrium with endogenous
lobbying; section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2Open Secret’s lobbying database is available on line at http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
3The same is true if we take the total value of spending in the period 1998-2010.
52 Related literature
Our paper brings together diﬀerent strands of the literature. It contributes to the political
economy of education by investigating the possibility that education policy responds to
the interest of ﬁrms exerting pressure on the policy-makers in order to obtain their favorite
human-capital composition. The political economy approach has mainly focused on the
redistributive role of education and on income distribution as the main determinant of
educational policy (see Di Gioacchino and Sabani, 2009). In this paper, we abstract away
from education’s redistributive role and focus on its eﬀect on the “production” of skills.
Thus, the conﬂict of interest is not among income groups but between ﬁrms active in
diﬀerent sectors and interested in the supply of diﬀerent skills. Our results point to the
possibility of multiple equilibria with diﬀerent mix of education and production.
The focus on the complementarity between education and the structure of production
closely relates our paper to the recent literature on the "varieties of capitalism" (Hall and
Soskice, 2001, Iversen, 2005) which emphasizes how workers’ investment in skills, ﬁrms’
international product market strategies, social protection and electoral politics reinforce
each other to determine a "welfare production regime".4 So, the relative abundance of
certain skills constitute a comparative advantage for ﬁrms that use those skills. Therefore,
ﬁrms, interested in speciﬁc skills will support education policies that ensure an adequate
return for workers who invest in those skills and social policies that protect this investment.
Along this lines, we explicitly model ﬁrms’ active political role in shaping education policy
through lobbying.
The idea that the educational structure is functional to the interest of ﬁrms (the capi-
talist class) can be found in Bowles (1978) and more recently in Galor and Moav (2006).5
4See also Bénabou (2003), where the distribution of human capital, technological choice and redistribu-
tive institutions are simultaneously determined. Unlike ours, in his paper ﬁr m sd on o tt r yt oi n ﬂuence the
distribution of human capital, which they take as given when choosing (the degree of ﬂexibility in) their
technology.
5T h er o l eo fs o c i a lc o n ﬂict in shaping the educational system has also been stressed by Bertocchi and
Spagat (2004). Other studies have identiﬁed diﬀerent sources of conﬂict between social classes, related for
instance to social mobility (see Bernasconi and Profeta, 2007).
6They argue that due to capital-skill complementarities, the accumulation of physical cap-
ital in the process of industrialization increased the importance of human capital and
generated incentives for capitalists to support the provision of universal education. Our
paper is tightly related to Galor and Moav (2006); as in their work, we view the educational
system as the upshot of political and economic conﬂicts; however, we assume heterogeneity
in the human capital used in diﬀerent industries and thus allow for a conﬂict of interests
among capitalists. Moreover, diﬀerently from previous contributions, we use lobbying to
characterize the political process and we develop an endogenous lobbying model.
Our paper is also related to the recent literature on the interplay among human capital,
technology, the structure of production and economic growth.6 Since Nelson and Phelps’
1966 seminal paper, it has been recognized that a more educated labour force would adopt
new technologies faster and, at the same time, the demand for skill would increase as new
technologies are introduced (Acemoglu, 2002). This literature points out the possibility
of multiple equilibria. One equilibrium is characterized by high levels of human capital,
faster adoption of new technologies and high share of production in high-tech industries,
while the other equilibrium depicts low levels of human capital, higher distance from the
“technological frontier” and production specialized in traditional sectors. A strand of this
literature has recognized the importance of distinguishing between diﬀerent types of human
capital. Vandenbussche et al. (2006) have shown the growth-enhancing eﬀects of tertiary
education, especially for economies close to the technological frontier. Murphy et al. (1991)
have demonstrated that the allocation of talent has signiﬁcant eﬀects on the growth rate
of an economy. The reason is that economies which reward entrepreneurship more than
rent seeking activities attract talented people in the more productive sectors. Using data
on college enrolment in law as a measure of talent allocated to rent seeking activities,
and on college enrolment in engineer as a measure of talent allocated to entrepreneurship,
their empirical evidence conﬁrms that countries with high proportion of engineers grow
faster than countries with high proportion of lawyers. Although not relating it to growth,
6On the macroeconomic side and the evolution of wage inequality, see also the literature on the role of
the skilled-biased technological change as responsible of the increase in the US skill premium (Krusell et
al., 1999).
7we reach a similar conclusion when discussing the individuals’ choice of education. More
recently, in a model of growth with households’ education choice and costly technological
adoption by ﬁrms, Krueger and Kumar (2004a, 2004b) have argued that an economy whose
policies favour skill-speciﬁc, vocational education, will growth slower than an economy
whose policies favour general education. As in their model, individuals decide which
type of education to acquire. However, diﬀerently from them, in this paper we set aside
technological progress, thus limiting ﬁrms’ economic role, to emphasize ﬁrms’ political role
in directing education spending.
3 The model
The economy is populated by ﬁrms and individuals. Firms are a continuum of measure
one and live indeﬁnitely. Each ﬁrm is owned by a single entrepreneur. Individuals are a
continuum of measure one and live for two periods.
The government ﬁnances skill formation through subsidies targeted to the acquisition
of diﬀerent education types. In the ﬁrst period of their lives, given government subsidies,
agents decide which type of education to obtain. In the second period they inelastically
supply labour and are hired by ﬁrms in the sector that use as input the skill they have ac-
quired. Firms may try to inﬂuence the government’s education policy by exerting lobbying
activity.
We restrict our attention to a two-sector and two-education type economy. Let  be the
fraction of ﬁrms in the ﬁrst sector () and using workers with the ﬁrst type of education
()a n d1 −  be the complementary set of ﬁrms, producing in the second sector ()a n d
using the second type of human capital ().7 We indicate by  the share of workers with
skill type  and by 1− the complementary share of workers with skill type .8 All ﬁrms
in the same sector are identical.
7We will suggest some interpretation of the results for two sectors with high and low productivity,
but the model itself is more general. The two sectors may diﬀer for the goods produced (e.g. service vs
manufacture) or for the use of general vs speciﬁc skills or they may diﬀer along other dimensions.
8The model is quite general. The two types of education may represent diﬀerent ﬁelds (e.g. business
vs engineering) as well as diﬀerent programme orientation (general vs vocational) etc.
83.1 Firms
Firms’ unique production input is labour. Recalling the deﬁnition of  and ,e a c hr e p -
resentative ﬁrm in sector  employs 
 workers and each representative ﬁrm in sector 
employs 1−
1− workers. Let   denote the level of labour-augmenting technology in
sector  and , respectively so that if workers with the ﬁrst type of education are more
productive than workers with the second one, we expect  to be larger than .













where  ∈ (1
21)
Total output in the two sectors and in the whole economy are, therefore:
 =  = 1−
 =( 1− ) =( 1− )1−(1 − )
 = 1− +( 1− )1−(1 − ) (3)
where total output price has been normalized to one and  and  denote (relative) prices
in the two sectors.
Labour market is competitive and workers are paid their marginal productivity; thus
wages for sector  and  are, respectively:9
 = 1−−1 (4)
and
 = (1 − )1−(1 − )−1 (5)
Notice that a worker’s wage depends positively on the size, productivity and price of the
sectors he is employed in and it is inversely related to the share of the population which
holds his same skill.
9If ﬁnal output is taken as numeraire, real wages are the same as monetary wages.
9Each representative ﬁrm in the two sectors earns proﬁts given by































 measures the relative size of the two sectors, 
1− measures the relative scarcity
of the two types of workers, 
 measures the relative productivity and

 the relative
price in the two sectors.10












which depends on the relative size, price and productivity of the two sectors. In what
follows we assume that productivity, price and size of the two sectors are exogenous,
and thus proﬁts only depend on the labour force skill composition, . T h i sl e a v e sl i t t l e
e c o n o m i cr o l ef o rﬁrms but allows us to concentrate on the ﬁrms’ political role.11 In the
next section, we will explain how  is determined by individuals’ decision, which is in
turn inﬂuenced by the government’s education policy, and discuss why ﬁrms may lobby
to inﬂuence the government’s education policy to their advantage.
3.2 Individuals
Following Krueger and Kumar (2004a and 2004b), we consider a continuum of two-period
lived agents with total mass one who diﬀer in their innate talent  ∈ [01],w h i c hi s
10The same variables also determine relative proﬁts in the two sectors.
11Having exogenous prices, is a clear, although in our context innocuous, simpliﬁc a t i o n .W h a tw eh a v ei n
mind is a non-competitive goods market structure. For example, assuming monopolistic competition, one
could easily derive the relative price (see Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007, but also Acemoglu 2002). On
the other hand, to endogenize ﬁrms’ economic role in technology adoption and sector shift would require
to specify a dynamic model, a task which we leave to future research.
10uniformly distributed across the population with a cumulative distribution function ()=
.
In the ﬁrst period of his life, an agent can opt to obtain either education of type 
or education of type . An agent who acquires skill  will be employed in sector  and
earn a wage  in the second period of life 12. An agent who acquires skill ,w i l lw o r ki n
sector  and earn wage  in the second period of life. Each agent receives a subsidy Σ
by the government related to the speciﬁct y p eo fe d u c a t i o n =  that he acquires.
Preferences are logarithmic. We assume that an agent with talent  who chooses the
education type  =  and will be employed in sector  =  has the following utility
function:13
()=l o g ( )+l o g ( Σ) − log() (10)
where () is the cost of obtaining education of type .14 Thus, an agent with talent ,







Assuming () is strictly decreasing (increasing), there exists a threshold level ∗ such that
agents with  ∗ choose education of type  (). Without loss of generality, in what
follows we restrict attention to the case in which () that is the relative cost of obtaining
education of type , is strictly decreasing.15 Thus, the share of workers with skill type 
is  =1− ∗.
The analysis above suggests that the allocation of talents to sectors is jointly deter-
mined by the market, which establishes relative wages, and by education policy.
12The agent’s task-speciﬁc productivity is at his highest value because the agent has received training
for the speciﬁc technology adopted in sector .
13The speciﬁcation of the utility function follows closely Krueger and Kumar (2004b). In particular, as
in their formulation, subsidy yields utility directly (for a rationalization of this, see footnote 18 in Krueger
and Kumar, 2004b).
14This takes into account pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs and returns, including the consumption
value of education. For an analysis of the choice of educational type which takes into account the con-
sumption value of education see Alstadsaer et al. (2008)
15That is we focus on the case in which education of type  requires higher talent than education of
type 
113.3 The government
We assume that the government’s objective function is a weighted sum of aggregate social
welfare ∆ and total lobby contributions :
Ω = ∆ +  (12)
where  is the relative weight given by the government to lobby contributions.16 The
higher is , the higher is government "aﬃnity" for political contributions and the lower is
its concern for social welfare.
As in the standard case of an utilitarian social welfare function, ∆ is speciﬁed as the
sum of total workers’ wage income in the two sectors ( =  and  =( 1− ))
and ﬁrms’ proﬁts in the two sectors (Π =  and Π =( 1−)). Speciﬁcally, we have
that:
∆ =  +  + Π + Π (13)
We assume that the government spends a total amount , exogenously given, on education
subsidies for the two types of education, Σ and Σ respectively.17 The government’s
budget constraint is thus:
Σ +( 1− )Σ =  (14)
Given the available resources , the government only chooses the allocation of subsidies
between the two types of education. Recalling the condition for the individual’s choice of
education at Eq. (11) and the expression for the relative wage at Eq. (8), it follows that,
given the sectors "relative importance" , the government’s allocation of subsidies uniquely
determines . Accordingly, in the rest of the paper, we consider  as the government’s
policy variable.
16Notice that both ∆ and  depend on the educational policy, as it will be speciﬁed in the next sections.
17 is here taken as exogenous. As suggested by Kruger and Kumar (2004), one can imagine that the
government collects taxes to ﬁnance education, through a proportional labour income tax. If preferences
are logarithmic, what matters for the education a ld e c i s i o ni st h er a t i oo fw a g e sw h i c hi sn o ta ﬀected by
a proportional tax. Alternatively, one can imagine that ﬁrms ﬁnance education spending of new workers
by paying a lump-sum tax which, again, does not aﬀect their behaviour (see Di Gioacchino and Profeta,
2010).
123.4 The social planner
We ﬁrst analyze the case of  =0 , i.e. the government puts no weight on lobby contribu-
tions and it behaves as a benevolent social planner. In this case Ω = ∆ as deﬁned at Eq.
(13)
Using Eq.(4), (5), (6), (7), the social planner’s objective function can be rewritten as
follows:
∆()=1− +( 1− )1−(1 − ) (15)
The eﬃcient mix of the two types of education coincides with the decision of the social
planner, who chooses  in order to maximize Eq.(15). Solving the ﬁrst order condition
(see the appendix), and remembering the expression of  at Eq.(9) we obtain the following





Obviously,  is decreasing in : the higher is sector  weight, relative to sector ,
t h em o r ei ti se ﬃcient to allocate resources to type  education than to type 
4 The lobbying game
The previous section has shown that the mix of the two types of education that would be
chosen by the social planner depends on the "relative importance" of the two sectors in
the economy, as measured by  In this section we analyze what happens when ﬁrms may
get organized and exert their political power to induce the government to deviate from
the eﬃcient outcome in the attempt to obtain a more favorable value of .
We assume that ﬁrms in both sectors may decide to be active in the lobbying process
and, following Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) seminal paper, we model lobbying as a
menu auction (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) in which interest groups oﬀer contingent
payments to the policy-maker in order to inﬂuence his action.18 Moreover, lobbying is
endogenous, as in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007): each lobby may decide to oﬀer
18This is the so-called inﬂuence motive for lobbying. Lobbies can be also motivated by electoral motives,
i.e. they might try to inﬂuence a candidate’s chance of winning the election (see Grossman and Helpman,
2001 for a discussion). In this case, lobbies’ contributions would be used to “buy” the vote of impressionable
13contributions to the government, which, simultaneously, decides whether to accept the
contributions oﬀered. The political equilibrium of this endogenous lobbying game repre-
sents the major novelty of our study. We also characterize the optimal mix of education
at the equilibrium.
4.1 Lobbying
There are two organized groups, one representing ﬁrms in sector , the other representing
ﬁrms in sector . Workers are politically not organized.19 Lobbies oﬀer political contri-
butions to the government in order to inﬂuence its choice of the education mix and the
government decides whether to accept them or not. We look at the conditions under which
ﬁrms in each sector will ﬁnd it convenient to invest in lobbying oﬀering contributions to
the government and the government, simultaneously, will decide whether to accept the
contributions oﬀered.
We indicate by () the payment oﬀered by each ﬁrm in sector  contingent on the
government choice of . Lobbying is costly: if the ﬁrm exerts lobby, it pays part of its
proﬁts as contributions to the government. We introduce two indicator functions: ,w h i c h
can take only two values,  =1if sector  oﬀe r sc o n t i n g e n tp a y m e n t sa n d =0if it
does not, and , which can take only two values,  =1if the government accepts the
contribution oﬀered by sector  and  =0if it does not accept it.20 As in Grossman
and Helpman (1994), contributions are restricted to be globally “truthful”, 21 that is ﬁrms
citizens (cfr. Grossman and Helpman, 1996). In our model we do not consider elections and restrict the
attention to post-electoral lobbying.
19We ﬁnd qualitatevely similar results if also workers exert lobby.
20As in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007), in our model at equilibrium the government always accepts
contributions. This is diﬀerent from Felli and Merlo (2006), where the policymaker chooses the set of
lobbies whom to bargain with excluding lobbies whose policy position is too close to its own.
21Bernheim and Winston (1996) show that if contribution functions are diﬀerentiable, they are locally
truthful. They also show that equilibria based on truthful strategies not only exist but always result in an
eﬃcient choice of action. For situations in which non-binding communication is possible, these equilibria
have a strong stability property, namely they are coalition-proof Nash. In other words, truthful equilibria
are stable even if coalitions of players can communicate to devise a mutually preferable strategy.






Truthful contribution functions oﬀered by each ﬁrm in sector  can thus be written as:
()=() −  if  =1 ; 0 otherwise (17)
where  are scalars which represents the reservation utility of the ﬁrm and will be deter-
mined in the appendix, while proving proposition 3.
Total lobby contributions can thus be expressed as follows:
()=()+( 1− )() (18)
4.2 Diﬀerent cases of active lobbying
To determine the political equilibrium with endogenous lobbying, we ﬁrst have to derive
the optimal mix of education in the diﬀerent cases of active lobbying, i.e. when both
sectors are active, or when just one of the two sectors exerts lobby.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which both sectors are active in the lobbying process, i.e.
 =  =1for  = . The government’s objective function reduces to:
Ω = ∆ + [()+( 1− )()]








































This implies that the government behaves as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of
workers wage (with weight equal to 1)a n dﬁrms’ proﬁts (with weight 1+). We can thus
prove the following result.
Proposition 1 When both sectors are active in the lobbying process, the equilibrium mix
of education spending is the same as the one that would be chosen by the social planner
( =  = 1
1+).
15Intuitively, if the two lobbies have the same weight in the government’s objective func-
tion, they lobby against each other and their political pressures exactly balance. Thus,
proposition 1 suggests that a diﬀerent weight between wages and proﬁts in the govern-
ment’s objective function (i.e. the value of ) does not alter the composition of human
capital as compared with what would be chosen by the social planner.
Suppose instead that only one sector is politically organized, for instance only the ﬁrst
sector exerts lobby. The government objective function becomes:
Ω =  +  + Π + Π +  (21)

































where  = [1 + (1 − )]
1
1− 
Deﬁning  =[ 1+(1 − )]
1
1−  1, we can notice that  = 
 and  = 
Thus, it is immediate to check that and thus     .T h i sp r o v e s
the result reported in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 When only the sector using the ﬁrst (second) type of education exerts
lobby, more resources are directed towards the ﬁrst (second) type of education with respect
to the social planner solution.
The proposition delivers an intuitive result: when only one sector exerts lobby, it
manages to attract more resources towards the type of education which is interesting for
16its production. With only one lobby, the weight given by government to contributions ()
aﬀects the composition of human capital: the higher is , the more the skill composition
is twisted towards the lobby’s favorite one.
4.3 Political equilibrium with endogenous lobbying
Il lobbying is endogenous, ﬁrms must decide whether (or not) it is worthwhile to set up a
lobby and pay the contributions required to inﬂuence the government’s education policy.
A sector will get organized if proﬁts, net of contributions, are higher if organized than if
not.
Having in mind the results in the previous section, we can characterize the endogenous
lobbying equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Active lobbying by both sectors is a Nash equilibrium of the political lob-
bying game.
Intuitively, if one sector sets up a lobby to inﬂuence the government’s choice, then the
other sector is better oﬀ by doing the same. At equilibrium both sectors will lobby and
the optimal mix of education coincides with the one chosen by the social planner.
4.4 Political equilibrium with costly lobbying
T h er e s u l to fa c t i v el o b b y i n gb yb o t hs e c t o r sa te q u i l i b r i u mi sh o w e v e rn o tt h ee n do f
the story. Organizing a lobby is costly: on top of payments for the administrative struc-
ture, expenditures are required for “establishing links with politicians, hiring professional
lobbyists, building a communications network among members, designing a scheme of
punishments for defaulting members, etc” (see Mitra, 1999).
Assume that to get organized a group has to pay a cost 0 (equal for both sectors).
In this case, an interest group may ﬁnd it convenient to lobby only if its net beneﬁti s
larger than its cost. Having this in mind, and remembering that  is our global indicator of
the “relative importance” of the two sectors, based on relative size, price and productivity,
we can prove the following result.
17Proposition 4 If the two sectors have the same "relative importance" ( =1 ), either
ﬁrms in both sectors will exert lobby or none of them will do it. If the two sectors have
ad i ﬀerent relative importance ( 6=1 ), there exists a level of  of the lobbying cost such
that only ﬁrms in the "relatively more important" sector will ﬁnd it convenient to exert
lobby (i.e. ﬁrms in sector  when 1 and ﬁrms in sector  when 1).
The above result suggests that the relative importance of the two sectors matters to
determine ﬁrms’ net beneﬁts from lobbying and thus, given the ﬁxed cost, the decision on
whether or not to set up a lobby. When only one sector exerts lobby, the equilibrium mix
of education is diﬀerent from the one decided by the social planner and, as we proved in
proposition 2, the sector exerting lobbying is able to direct education expenditure in favor
of the type of education that is needed for its production.
Given the expression of , a sector’s relative importance depends on its share in total
output, its relative productivity and relative price. Thus, the inﬂuence that a sector has
on the economy’s composition of human capital can be attributed to its size, its market
structure (price), its share of value added and its relative productivity. A small sector
open to competition and less exposed to technical progress for instance might ﬁnd it
diﬃcult to get organized, due to the limited amount of proﬁt st h a tc a nb eu s e dt o" b r i b e "
the policymaker. Moreover, size itself is important in determining a sector’s decision on
whether or not to lobby; in fact, given the ﬁxed cost to be paid to organize a lobby,
per-ﬁrm cost will be lower the higher the number of ﬁrms. This is of course due to our
assumption that the cost is ﬁxed and in particular it does not depend on the number of
ﬁrms belonging to a lobby.22
A natural interpretation of our results is given in case the two sectors diﬀer for the
type of technology adopted, low-technology and high-technology. In this case, proposi-
tion 4 suggests that, if the low-technology sector is the one which, due to its "relative
importance", ﬁnds it convenient to exert lobby, it will also be able to direct public ex-
penditure toward ﬁelds of education functional to a low-tech economy. Viceversa, if the
22The assumption of ﬁxed cost may seem quite restrictive, as some organizational cost are likely to
increase with the number of ﬁrms. However what matters here is that the cost in per capita terms
decreases as the number of ﬁrms increases.
18high-technology sector is the one that ﬁnds it convenient to exert lobby, an equilibrium
will emerge in which the type of education functional to technical progress and growth
will be favoured.
Two natural extensions are worth mentioning at this point. First, one may want to
allow for heterogeneity in the ﬁxed cost because groups may diﬀer in their organizational
abilities (see Mitra, 1999) or “proximity” to the government (see Faccio, 2006). Obviously,
the sector that has a smaller  will,  , ﬁnd it more convenient to exert
lobby. Second, one may want to allow for heterogeneity in the weight attributed by the
government to contributions paid by diﬀerent groups. In both circumstances, even if the
two sectors have the same importance ( =1 ) it may be that only the sector "closer"
to the government ﬁnds it convenient to get organized, and thus, to obtain that more
resources are directed towards the type of education that it uses.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have presented a two-sector political economy model in which individuals choose the
type of education to acquire and the government’s education policy aﬀects this choice. In
our setting, ﬁrms may lobby the policymaker in the attempt to obtain the desired supply of
skill. Our purpose is to contribute to explain the observed diﬀerences in education systems
and the relation between the composition of education and the structure of production.
As we know that lobbying activity is diﬀused in many countries (such as US and
Canada) and that ﬁrms may lobby for education, we argue that a country’s skill compo-
sition can be the result of lobbying activity by ﬁrms active in diﬀerent sectors.
We have shown that, if organizing a lobby is costly, an equilibrium might emerge in
which ﬁrms in the "stronger" sector are able to bribe the policymaker and twist its choice
of the education mix towards the type of skill needed in their production. Thus, lobbying
may induce persistence in an economy’s output composition.
As we pointed out before, our model is quite general and can be used to analyze
many real situations. One example would be the case of traditional (low-technology)
versus technology-driven industries. If the traditional sector is "stronger", then our model
19predicts that, under the inﬂuence of lobbying, a country might be trapped in a low-skill
and low-technology specialization. Next, consider a country that to face competition on
the global market is planning to change its productive specialization. Suppose it wants to
reduce the relative size of the ﬁnancial sector and promote the so-called green economy.
A c c o r d i n gt oo u rr e s u l t ,i ft h eﬁnancial sector, a top lobbyists in the US, is powerful
enough, then, the status quo is likely to persist unless industrial policy is coordinated
with education policy. To give yet another example, consider an established and relative
sheltered sector vis-à-vis a new, highly innovative and potentially growing sector. Once
again, without a proper policy (e.g. liberalization) or a shock that twists the balance of
power in favor of the new sector, the status quo is bound to prevail.
An interesting application of the model would consider immigration policy. In this
setting, the labor force consists of previously trained individuals and immigrants, i.e. in-
dividuals trained abroad. Our model would suggest that, under the inﬂuence of lobbying,
countries specialized in high-tech sectors will favor the in-coming of highly qualiﬁed im-
migrants; on the contrary, countries with a structure of production mainly devoted to
traditional sectors will be biased in favor of low-qualiﬁed immigrants.
A natural extension of our model would be to investigate into the causes which deter-
mine the relative importance of the two sectors . In our framework, to move from one
equilibrium to the other, an exogenous shock is needed. In a truly dynamic settings all
the parameters inﬂuencing  should be endogenized. In particular, innovation might dif-
ferentially inﬂuence productivity in the two sectors and thus would be a natural candidate
as driving force for this dynamics. To move the equilibrium, technological progress would
have to overcome the pressure for the status quo that comes from lobbying.
Our results also raise several crucial questions on the normative side: how can a country
aﬀord the challenge of globalization, if it does not attract talented individuals in ﬁelds of
education which produce the skills needed in highly innovative and potentially growing
sectors? 23
23As explained by Parente and Prescott (2000) the protection of specialized groups of factor suppliers
and corporate interests through constraints relating to the use of technology may even be detrimental for
growth.
20Finally, in terms of policy implications, we suggest that education policy and the
structure of education together with industrial policy should be given top priorities in the
governments’ agenda, and the role of lobbying activities by ﬁrms should not be neglected.
In particular, countries should carefully consider the lobbying activity exerted by tradi-
tional sectors with low-technology specialization and its consequences on the industrial
structure and the overall economy.
6A p p e n d i x
6.1 The social planner
Recalling the social planner’s objective function:
∆ = 1− +( 1− )1−(1 − )
its maximization delivers the following ﬁrst order condition
1−−1 − (1 − )1−(1 − )−1 =0






















which corresponds to Eq.(16). Notice that  ∈ (01)
6.2 Proof of proposition 1




which delivers the same level  chosen by the social planner at Eq. (16).
216.3 Proof of proposition 3
To show that lobbying by both sectors is a Nash equilibrium, we have to check that if one
sector lobbies then the other is better oﬀ by doing the same. We proceed in two steps: (i)
compute the scalars  and  (ii) show that if ﬁrms in sector () are lobbying, then
ﬁrms in sector () are better oﬀ by paying the contributions and have  rather than
paying no contribution and having the level of  that would be chosen if only the other
sector would lobby.
(i) Computation of  and 
To compute , consider the case where only ﬁrms in the ﬁrst sector exert lobby. In
this case we know that the equilibrium mix of education spending is given by Eq.(23) with
  .I f ﬁrms in sector  pay contributions and the government accepts them, the
government’s objective function is:
Ω()=∆()+()=∆()+[Π() − ] (25)
On the other hand, if both sectors exert lobby, then  = . In this case the government
objective function is:
Ω()=∆()+[()+(1−)()] = ∆()+[Π()−+Π()−(1−)]
Thus, to induce the government to accept its contributions, sector  should leave the
government at least indiﬀerent between Ω() and Ω() which requires
 =
∆() − ∆()+[Π() − Π()] + Π()
(1 − )
(26)
Each ﬁrm in sector  will ﬁnd it convenient to pay the contributions only if () −
()=  () i.e. if
(1−)[ − ()] = ∆()−∆()+[Π() − Π()]+Π()−Π()  0
(27)
Similarly, we can compute
 =
∆() − ∆()+[Π() − Π()] + Π()

22Each ﬁrm in sector  will ﬁnd it convenient to pay the contributions only if () −
()=  () i.e. if
 [ − ()] = ∆()−∆()+[Π() − Π()]+Π()−Π()  0 (28)
If the above conditions are satisﬁed, then, if sector () lobbies then sector () is better
oﬀ by doing the same.
(ii) We now show that the above conditions for a Nash equilibrium are satisﬁed





(where  =  if  =  ;  =  if  =  ;  =  if  =  )





































































which, after some algebra con be rewritten as


















23and, using the expression at Eq. (30) as
[1 + (1 − )][∆() − ∆()]  0
which is clearly satisﬁed given that the function ∆() reaches its maximum at  = .
S i m i l a r l y ,w ec a ne a s i l yc h e c kt h a t −()=[ 1+(1 − )][∆() − ∆()]  0.
Q.E.D.
6.4 Proof of proposition 4
Remember that
(1 − )[ − ()] = [1 + (1 − )][∆() − ∆()]
and
 [ − ()] = [1 + (1 − )][∆() − ∆()]
Given the (total) cost () of organizing a lobby, ﬁrms in sector  will lobby if  −
()  
 and ﬁrms in sector  if −()  
(1−). Thus, using the above expressions,
if ∆()=∆() either ﬁrms in sector  and ﬁrms in sector  all exert lobby, or none of
them do it; if ∆()  ∆() then there exists a level of  such that only ﬁrms in sector
 exert lobby; ﬁnally, if ∆()  ∆() then there exists a level of  such that only ﬁrms
























































(1 + 1−) In this case either
ﬁrms in both sectors lobby or none of them










(1 + 1−) In this case there
exists a level of  such that only ﬁrms in sector  lobby










(1 + 1−) In this case there
exists a level of  such that only ﬁrms in sector  lobby
Notice that, using  = 















where, as we know, 1 and  =[ 1+(1 − )]
1
1−  1.








The three cases to be proved are thus:
(i) for  =1  ()=() and thus ∆()=∆(), i.e. either ﬁr m si nb o t hs e c t o r s
lobby or none of them
(ii) for (01), ()  () and thus ∆()  ∆(), i.e. there exists a level of 
such that only ﬁrms in sector  lobby
(iii) for 1, ()  () and thus ∆()  ∆() i.e. there exists a level of  such
that only ﬁrms in sector  lobby
Result (i) is straightforward. For  =1we have that (1) = (1) = 1+
(1+).
To prove results (ii) and (iii) we proceed in 5 steps.
STEP 1 It is suﬃcient to prove (ii), i.e. if ()  () for (01) then ()  ()for
1i.e. (iii) is satisﬁed.
25This is because we can easily check that (1
) − (1
)=1− [() − ()].T h u s , i f
for 1, ()  () we have that (1
)  (1
) which means that ()  () for any
1.
Thus, in what follows we restrict to [01]
STEP 2 () is increasing and concave.
We ﬁrst calculate 0():
0()=
( + ) − ( + )
( + )+1 (37)
which is always positive for 1 and 1.
The second derivative of () with respect to  can be written as follows:
00()=
(1 − )( + )+1 − ( +1 ) (  + ) [(1 − )+(  − )]
( + )2+2
which, after simple algebra, becomes
00()=
−(1 − ) − 
£
2 − −1(1 − )
¤
( + )+2
which is negative given that 2 − −1(1 − )  0 for 1 and 1.
Notice that having () always increasing implies that (1) = (1) = 1+
(1+) (0) =
(0) = 1
STEP 3 Function () is either always increasing (if    ), or it has a minimum
at  = −
+1(1−) (if    ).
We ﬁrst calculate 0():
0()=
(1 + ) − (1 + )
(1 + )+1 (38)
which delivers the result at step 3.
STEP 4 () is concave for b  = +1−2−1
(1−) and convex for b  with b 1.
The second derivative of () with respect to  can be written as follows:
00()=
+1(1 − )(1 + )+1 − ( + 1)(1 + ) £
+1(1 − )+ − 
¤
(1 + )2+2
which, after simple algebra, becomes:
00()=
−(1 − )+1 − 2 +(  +1 ) 
(1 + )+2 
26which is equal to zero at  = b , it is positive for b  and negative for b .
Again, given that 1 and 1 it is easy to check that b 1.
STEP 5 0(0)  0(0) and 0(1)  0(1).





















































0(0) = (0)[ − ]=[  − ]







[−]  1 for any value of the parameters 















Using (1) = (1) = 1+




(1 + ) − (1 + )
1+ − (1 + )
27which, using Mathematica can be proved to be always greater than 1 for any value of the
parameters 
To sum up, we have considered the two functions  and , which reach the same value at
 =0and  =1 .I nt h ei n t e r v a l(01) function  is always increasing and concave, function
 may either be always increasing or ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing. However, given
that at  =0function  has a derivative higher than function , function  starts above
function . Since they never cross again before  =1 , function  remains above function 
till  =1 . Given that at  =1instead function  has a higher derivative than  and both
are concave at that point, function  crosses function  at  =1 .W eh a v ea l s op r o v e dt h a t
having  above  for the interval (01) also implies that  is below  for 1.Q . E . D .
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Australia 3,5    1,5    5,2   3,8    8.786 62,6 59,2  
Austria 3,6    1,3    5,4    5,1    10.974 18,6 25,0  
Belgium 4,1    1,3    6,1    5,9    9.162 34,4 27,8  
Canada 3,5    2,6    6,1    4,6    m 90,7 40,0  
Czech Republic 2,8    1,2    4,6    4,1    5.426 24,7 37,3  
Denmark 4,3    1,7    7,1    6,6    10.759 53,3 46,5  
Finland 3,6    1,6    5,6    5,5    8.440 35,6 82,0  
France 3,9    1,4    6,0    5,5    8.932 45,2 35,4  
Germany 3,0    1,1    4,7    4,0    8.270 42,7 25,5  
Greece m    m    m    m    m 68,8 23,6  
Hungary 3,2    0,9    4,9    4,9    4.811 79,8 34,3  
Iceland 5,1    1,2    7,8    7,0    9.015 54,3 57,4  
Ireland 3,48    1,2    4,7    4,4    8.628 55,9 46,1  
Italy 3,1    0,9    4,5    4,1    7.948 34,6 32,8  
Japan 2,8    1,5    4,9    3,3    9.312 75,6 39,4  
Korea 4,0    2,4    7,0    4,2    7.325 72,7 43,4  
Luxembourg 3,1    m    m    m    m 38,8 5,3  
Mexico 3,8    1,2    5,7    4,7    2.598 92,2 18,1  
Netherlands 3,7    1,5    5,6    4,7    9.883 34,6 44,7  
New Zealand 4,0    1,5    5,9    4,8    6.226 m 50,7  
Norway 3,7    1,3    5,5    5,4    11.967 59,6 44,9  
Poland 3,4    1,3    5,3    4,8    4.134 62,3 50,0  
Portugal 3,5    1,6    5,6    5,1    6.677 67,6 45,3  
Slovak Republic 2,5    0,9    4,0    3,4    3.694 25,7 57,1  
Spain 2,9    1,1    4,8    4,2    8.618 53,9 29,8  
Sweden 4,1    1,6    6,3    6,1    10.262 43,5 39,2  
Switzerland 4,0    1,2    5,5    5,1    13.031 30,4 30,4  
Turkey m    m    m    m    m 66,4 19,7  
United Kingdom 4,2    1,3    5,8    5,2    9.600 100,0 40,1  









































Australia 0,11 0,11 0,43 0,12 0,07 0,01 0,15 0,03
Austria 0,11 0,10 0,39 0,13 0,14 0,01 0,10 0,02
Belgium 0,05 0,17 0,36 0,07 0,13 0,03 0,16 0,01
Canada 0,11 0,13 0,37 0,13 0,08 0,01 0,10 0,03
Czech Republic 0,16 0,07 0,32 0,10 0,17 0,04 0,07 0,04
Denmark 0,09 0,15 0,28 0,08 0,12 0,01 0,26 0,01
Finland 0,08 0,17 0,26 0,12 0,15 0,02 0,15 0,05
France 0,02 0,14 0,42 0,14 0,13 0,01 0,10 0,04
Germany 0,09 0,22 0,27 0,16 0,12 0,01 0,09 0,02
Greece 0,12 0,18 0,32 0,14 0,12 0,03 0,08 0,01
Hungary 0,19 0,09 0,39 0,06 0,08 0,02 0,10 0,08
Iceland 0,21 0,10 0,39 0,06 0,07 0,00 0,15 0,02
Ireland 0,09 0,20 0,34 0,13 0,08 0,01 0,14 0,01
Italy 0,06 0,16 0,36 0,07 0,15 0,02 0,15 0,03
Japan 0,06 0,17 0,35 0,05 0,19 0,03 0,08 0,02
Korea 0,10 0,19 0,23 0,10 0,23 0,02 0,09 0,04
Luxembourg 0,00 0,15 0,48 0,29 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,02
Mexico 0,14 0,04 0,42 0,10 0,14 0,02 0,10 0,03
Netherlands 0,15 0,09 0,37 0,06 0,08 0,01 0,18 0,05
New Zealand 0,14 0,16 0,40 0,13 0,07 0,01 0,17 0,01
Norway 0,18 0,09 0,29 0,08 0,08 0,01 0,24 0,05
Poland 0,17 0,08 0,43 0,08 0,09 0,02 0,09 0,05
Portugal 0,09 0,10 0,32 0,15 0,22 0,03 0,21 0,07
Slovak Republic 0,17 0,06 0,31 0,08 0,13 0,02 0,17 0,05
Spain 0,15 0,09 0,29 0,10 0,14 0,02 0,16 0,05
Sweden 0,21 0,06 0,24 0,07 0,17 0,01 0,27 0,01
Switzerland 0,12 0,13 0,37 0,12 0,12 0,01 0,10 0,02
Turkey 0,24 0,06 0,41 0,09 0,09 0,03 0,06 0,02
United Kingdom 0,10 0,18 0,34 0,14 0,09 0,01 0,14 0,01








































Australia 2,3 7,8 11,2 2,3 7,4 13,1 7,7 29,6 18,6 69,0 0,7 3,1
Austria 1,7 0,5 20,0 2,4 6,9 17,3 6,2 24,3 20,8 68,6 2,2 8,4
Belgio 0,9 0,1 16,7 2,2 5,1 14,5 8,4 28,8 23,4 75,1 2,0 6,9
Czech Republic 2,6 1,3 26,3 4,3 6,3 14,9 10,7 16,4 17,3 59,2 1,8 11,1
Denmark 1,3 4,1 14,2 2,1 5,7 14,1 7,7 24,2 26,6 72,5 2,4 6,2
Finland 2,7 0,4 23,7 2,3 6,0 12,0 10,1 20,8 22,1 64,9 5,2 10,8
France 2,1 0,0 12,8 1,7 6,0 12,6 6,4 33,7 24,9 77,5 1,9 5,3
0,9 0,2 23,4 2,4 3,9 11,7 5,8 29,2 22,4 69,2 2,8 13,4
3,9 0,5 10,2 2,6 6,7 24,2 9,4 18,6 23,9 76,1 0,5 1,9
Hungary 4,1 0,2 22,5 2,6 4,8 13,1 7,7 22,3 22,8 65,9 4,2 11,9
Iceland 6,3 0,0 10,9 3,9 11,3 11,5 6,3 26,0 23,7 67,5 1,0 2,0
Ireland 1,6 0,5 22,1 1,2 10,2 13,1 5,3 27,7 18,3 64,4 6,0 12,8
Italy 2,1 0,4 18,7 2,1 6,1 15,3 7,4 26,9 21,0 70,7 1,7 6,9
Japan 1,4 0,1 20,7 3,2 6,1 17,0 6,4 26,7 18,4 68,5 3,3 10,6
Korea 3,3 0,3 28,0 2,3 9,0 9,8 7,1 21,2 19,0 57,1 7,1 16,2
Luxembourg 0,4 0,1 8,7 1,2 5,8 11,0 8,7 48,5 15,6 83,9 .. 1,6
Netherlands 2,2 3,3 13,9 1,9 5,5 14,8 7,1 27,7 23,6 73,2 1,1 5,3
New Zealand 5,4 1,3 14,5 2,8 5,5 14,6 7,2 29,9 18,9 70,6 .. ..
Norway 1,5 27,8 10,0 2,6 4,5 9,5 7,5 17,0 19,7 53,7 0,8 ..
Poland 4,3 2,4 18,8 3,5 6,4 20,1 7,4 18,3 18,9 64,6 1,1 6,0
Portugal 2,8 0,0 14,8 2,9 6,6 17,3 7,0 22,0 26,5 72,9 0,7 3,2
Slovak Republic 3,6 0,4 24,1 6,8 7,7 16,7 7,2 17,6 15,9 57,4 1,6 8,2
Spain 2,8 0,3 15,5 2,0 12,1 18,0 6,9 21,7 20,8 67,4 0,9 5,2
Sweden 1,4 0,6 19,7 2,8 4,7 12,6 7,3 25,4 25,3 70,6 4,1 10,3
Switzerland 1,2 0,2 19,8 2,0 5,6 15,5 6,4 29,4 19,9 71,2 .. 11,6
United Kingdom 0,7 2,7 13,0 1,6 6,3 14,4 6,9 31,0 23,4 75,7 2,2 5,5
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